One of the most frequently debated issues in Congress over the past few years has been the value of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) relative to the dollar. It is no secret that congressmen in the U.S. frequently accuse China of being a "currency manipulator." This paper has two objectives. First, it investigates the extent to which PAC contributions from key interest groups as well as constituent interests influence the frequency with which congressmen criticize China's exchange rate policy, controlling for other factors. The results indicate that the odds that a congressman will call China a "currency manipulator" are 1.35 times higher for every additional $5,000 in PAC contributions from groups that favor legislation against China. The odds go up to 1.8 for an additional $10,000 in PAC contributions. In addition, a one percentage point increase in the share of the congressional district labor force in manufacturing is associated with 19.6 percent increase in the likelihood that the district's legislator will label China a "currency manipulator." Second, this paper investigates the consequences that "currency manipulation" bashing may have on the rate at which the RMB appreciates against the U.S. dollar. The results for a VAR model indicate that an increase in the incidence of "currency manipulation" bashing appears to temporarily slow down, rather than accelerate, the rate at which the Renmibi appreciates against the dollar. This result suggests that bashing China may actually be counterproductive.
I. Introduction
The value of the renminbi (RMB) relative to the U.S. dollar and how it influences the US--China trade balance has been one of the most salient and debated issues in U.S. Congress and the administration over the last few years. Many members of Congress lay blame on China's exchange rate policy for explaining the decline in U.S. competitiveness as well as the loss of "American jobs" to places overseas, and in particular, to China. Since 2003, this dispute has resulted in a rise congressional activity manifested in the introduction of several bills presumably aiming a rectifying the apparent inequities caused by China's currency policy stance (Xie, 2010) . On September 29, 2010, the House of Representatives passed by a wide margin the "Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act" (H.R. 2378), a bill that would permit the imposition of countervailing duties on countries found to have an "undervalued currency."
Concurrent with the rise in China--related congressional legislation there has been a significant increase in verbal criticisms of China's exchange rate policy. When expressing these criticisms, legislators typically voice the particular grievance keywords "currency manipulation." For example, in March 2010, 130 congressmen signed a petition to Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury, urging him to officially classify China as a "currency manipulator." Such classification would then permit Congress to consider adopting punitive action against China (Staiger and Sykes, 2010 ). This paper is not about questioning whether the RMB is or is not undervalued relative to the dollar. A plethora of papers have already been written on this issue. 1 But China is not the only country in the world that may have an undervalued currency. If fact, using IMF figures for the implied Purchasing Power Parity and actual exchange rates for 2009, the degree of the RMB undervaluation relative to the U.S. dollar (approximately 43%) was within one standard deviation away from the mean undervaluation among a random sample of 45 currencies (see Figure 1 ). The fact that China tends to get singled out in Congress for its currency stance raises suspicion that perhaps "currency manipulation" bashing has less to do with the degree of undervaluation and more to do with the influence interest groups exert in Congress. Thus, one of the two objectives of this paper is to answer the question: To what extent do interest groups influence legislators to bash China for its exchange rate management policy?
The second objective of this paper is to understand the consequences of such bashing on the rate at which the RMB appreciates against the U.S. dollar. Both objectives reinforce each other, which is why they are analyzed in one paper.
Knowing why bashing occurs is important because of the consequences that it may have.
To answer the first question posed above I use a standard political economy model that explains the frequency with which members of Congress bash China through "currency manipulation" criticisms in the 111 th Congress (2009 Congress ( --2010 .
Specifically, I count the number of times each congressmen voiced the particular keywords "currency manipulation" in the context of China. I then fit a regression of 1 The vast majority of these papers argue that the RMB is undervalued by some 20 to 40 percent. Whether a revaluation of the RMB or even adopting a flexible exchange rate regime will help to correct the U.S.-China trade imbalance is still in dispute. For more on this issue see Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010) and Chinn and Wei (forthcoming). this count on the amount of money congressmen received from interest groups that were in favor of enacting the "Currency Reform for Fair Trade" bill (H.R. 2378), controlling for other factors known to influence legislative voting behavior, such as ideology, party affiliation, constituent interests, and how they voted on H.R. 2378.
The results of this first test are consistent with expectations. I find that PAC money from groups that supported the enactment of the September 2010 bill is by far the most important determinant of congressional China bashing. A $5,000 payment from these groups is associated with legislators being 1.35 times more likely to criticize China for being a "currency manipulator."
As indicated, the second objective of this paper is to evaluate whether currency manipulation bashing has worked. Presumably, its ultimate objective is to make China abandon its current exchange rate management policy, or at least let it appreciate against the dollar some 20 to 40 percent, if not more. Therefore, it seems pertinent to investigate how the Chinese authorities respond to this bashing, if at all.
To accomplish this objective, I create a bashing index based on the total count of "currency manipulation" news reported in major U.S. newspapers from January 2000 through December 2010. I then test whether the recent nominal appreciation of the Chinese RMB against the U.S. dollar can be linked to the currency manipulation bashing index. If bashing works, one would expect to observe a positive relationship between this index and the rate at which the RMB has appreciated.
The results of the second test suggest that bashing appears to influence the nominal exchange rate for about 3 months, but perhaps not in the direction the U.S. would favor. The relationship between bashing and the rate at which the RMB has appreciated is negative. This result implies that bashing may actually be counterproductive: the more of it there is, the less likely that it will work. The rest of the paper is summarized as follows: Section II describes in more detail the construction of the currency manipulation count for each legislator. It also provides information regarding the data sources used in the first test. Section III presents the political economy model and the regression specification. Section IV discusses the empirical findings of the first test. The second question addressed in this paper is discussed in Section V. Part A addresses the data underlying the construction of the China "currency manipulation" bashing index, which is used in the VAR model (discussed in Part B). That section also discusses the empirical results of the VAR model. Section VI offers some concluding remarks.
II. First Test: Data
As indicated in the introduction, the first objective of this paper is to understand the effect that PAC money may exert on a legislator's incentive to bash China for its exchange rate management policy. This test requires a quantifiable measure of legislator--specific currency manipulation bashing. To develop such measurement, I use the Factiva search engine to count the number of media articles that contain the following keywords: "China" and "currency manipulation" or "currency manipulator" or "exchange manipulation" or "exchange rate manipulator" and that also included the legislator's name. 2 The coverage period for this count is from January 3, 2009 (the first day of the 111 th Congress) to August 31, 2010 (the last day of the last month before the House voted on H.R. 2378, the "Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act"). This procedure resulted in a discrete count of articles for each legislator in the 111 th Congress.
As one would expect, the distribution for this count variable is skewed. (Kau and Rubin, 1979; Rosenthal, 2007, and Levitt, 1996) .
A commonly used ideology index is Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) comprehensive DW--Nominate scores. The more negative the score, the more "liberal" the legislator is deemed to be. Analogously, the higher (and the more positive) the score, the more "conservative" is the legislator. DW--Nominate scores are highly correlated with party affiliation. Therefore, studies that include this measure of ideology tend to not include party affiliation as an additional covariate.
After all, the information contained in party affiliation is also contained in the DW--Nominate score. Nonetheless, it is possible party affiliation exerts influence on legislative behavior, even after controlling for ideology. For that reason, this variable is kept in the regression specifications.
The role of PAC contributions in shaping legislative voting behavior has also been extensively emphasized in the political economy literature, although the degree to which it matters is still not fully resolved (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder, 2003) . In the context of this paper, there are well--defined interest groups with opposing views regarding China's exchange rate management policy: those who may be adversely affected by a low value of the RMB, and those who are positively affected by it. In order to identify which group falls into which camp, I rely on the PAC contribution data that individual groups made to different legislators at the onset of the passage of H.R. 2378. Clearly, businesses that have lost the most from the rise in the bilateral trade deficit would be most willing to influence congressional legislative action against China. Contributions from these groups can also be interpreted as buying Congressional bashing against China for its currency management policy.
There are also interest groups that benefit from a high value of the dollar vis--à--vis the RMB. Such groups tend to represent importers of Chinese intermediate and final products, whose profitability clearly depend on the exchange rate. For these businesses, a high value of the dollar relative to the RMB keeps them competitive. 4 The political economy literature also highlights the importance of constituent interests in influencing legislative behavior (e.g. Zupan, 1984, 1990; Krehbiel, 1993) . According to these models, legislators, in their quest for maximizing their chances for reelection, react to constituent interests and behave according to their preferences. In the context of this paper, congressional districts that have been disproportionally affected by trade with China, such as districts that are more oriented towards manufacturing industries, are more likely to be in favor of legislation against China. They are also more likely to be critical of China's exchange rate policy.
Of course, there may be congressional districts that benefit from trade with China. Districts with a significant amount of employment in trade industries, such as wholesalers, are unlikely to favor legislation against China. Therefore, it is important to control for the influence of constituent interests in the regressions.
III. First Test: Model Specification
The model adopted in this analysis is grounded in the political economy model of legislative behavior. 5 Formally, the regression specification is:
( 1) In equation (1), the dependent variable is cmb, which stands for "currency manipulation bashing" from Congress member i. This variable is the legislator--specific currency manipulation count described above.
The independent variables PAC_Favor and PAC_Against capture the influence of PAC contributions on the frequency of currency manipulation bashing. A priori, one would expect to be positive. As the legislator receives more contributions from interest groups that stand to lose from trade with China, the incidence of bashing should rise.
By contrast, PAC_Against should not have any significant influence on cmb.
Why not? cmb tracks legislator--specific statements that are critical of China for its exchange rate regime stance. In fact, the specific keywords "currency manipulation"
or "currency manipulator" conveys a message with a disapproving judgment or tone against China. Therefore, it is unlikely that legislators who do not agree China has an exchange rate problem would use it. Even if they did-say, to deny that there is a"currency manipulation" issue-the incidence of its usage would likely be very limited.
The variable DW_Nom controls for the influence that ideology may have on how a legislator feels about China's exchange rate regime stance. Poole and Rosenthal (2007) provide two dimensions for this variable. To be as comprehensive as possible, the model includes both of them. Ideology is an important variable to include because it is possible that ideological differences among congressmen can explain differences on how they feel about China. Since it is correlated with party affiliation, this last variable is excluded from the model. 6
To capture the influence of constituent interests equation (1) As mentioned before, the dependent variable, cmb, is a count variable that is discrete in nature. Therefore, equation (1) is unlikely to satisfy the basic assumptions underlying ordinary least square regressions-continuity and normalcy of the error terms. Under such circumstances a more appropriate technique to follow is to use either a Poisson regression, or a negative binomial regression (Hilbe, 2011) . Equation (1) is estimated using the negative binomial regression, as opposed to the Poisson regression, as one of the critical assumptions behind the use of the Poisson regression-that the mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable ought to be roughly similar-is violated. 8 Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that when the regressions were done using the Poisson technique, the results were very similar. 9
IV. First Test: Empirical Findings This estimate is measured with enough statistical precision that it is rendered significant at the less than 0.001 percent. Of course, the results from Regression (1) do not control for other factors. However, the remaining regressions suggest that the estimated coefficient survives the inclusion of the full set of controls. The reported estimate ranges from around 1.26 to 1.32 in Regressions (2) through (5).
Thus, even after including all control variables (in Regression 5), the results unambiguously indicate that PAC contributions is associated with higher levels of Congressional China bashing.
Regressions (2) through (5) also indicate that there are other factors that affect the incidence of currency manipulation bashing. Regression (2), for example, includes measures of ideology as well as the political affiliation indicator variable.
The 1 st dimension of the DW--Nominate scores variable as well as the "Democrat"
indicator variable are statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all but one instance. (In Regression (5) the "Democrat" variable is significant at the 10 percent level.) Thus, we can conclude that both ideology as well as political affiliation influence the incidence of bashing. The "Democrat" indicator variable suggests that it is more the Republican legislators the ones that criticize China's exchange rate policy more frequently, holding all else constant.
Regression (3), (4), and (5) indicate that constituent interests also matter.
The "Manufacturing" variable coefficient, for example, ranges from 1.78 to about 2.07. These magnitudes imply that a one percentage point increase in the manufacturing employment share of the labor force at the congressional district is associated with an increase of approximately 19.6 percent in the incidence of currency manipulation bashing by the legislator of that district, holding all else the same. 10 The "Trade" sector variable (in Regressions (4) and (5)), measure the wholesale employment share of the labor force at the district level. Although the estimated coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level, they are in line with expectations. The fact that they are less than one suggests that a higher proportion of the congressional district's labor force involved in the trade industry is associated with a lower incidence of currency manipulation bashing by the district's legislator.
As a robustness check, the indicator variable "Yes Vote" is included in Regression (5). This variable takes the value of 1 if the legislator voted in favor of the "Currency Reform for Fair Trade" bill. As explained above, the idea behind the inclusion of this variable is to control for any remaining factors not already captured by the other covariates, and to evaluate its effect on the PAC contribution variable.
The estimated coefficient, although it is larger than one, is not statistically significant at standard levels. This finding suggests that the model appears to 10 The 19.6 percent figure is calculated as follows: since the mean manufacturing share is 10 percent, a one percentage point increase (i.e. from 0.10 to 0.11) is equivalent to a 9.53 percent increase in log terms (=ln(0.11)-ln(0.10)). With the estimated negative binomial factor of approximately 2, this translates to a 19.6 percent increase in currency manipulation bashing.
capture the relevant variables that explain the incidence of bashing among legislators.
In order to better gauge the importance of PAC contributions for explaining bashing, the regressions were re--estimated with the PAC contributions variable in units of $10,000, while keeping all the other covariates the same. The results suggest that the effect of PAC contributions on Congressional bashing is monotonic.
An additional $10,000 in PAC contributions from groups that favored the enactment of H.R. 2378 increases the odds that a legislator would engage in bashing by about 31 to 35 percent. For example, the estimated coefficient in the first regression increases by nearly 35 percent, from 1.35 to 1.82. Thus, the more money the legislator received, the more intense was his/her bashing.
Overall, the results of this first test deliver a clear and consistent message:
Congressional bashing of China's exchange rate policy is intimately associated with PAC contributions from business interests as well as constituent interests directly affected by the bilateral trade deficit.
V. Second Test: Does "Currency Manipulation" Bashing Work?
As mentioned in the introduction, investigating the issue of whether "currency manipulation" bashing affects the nominal RMB/$ exchange rate complements the first test discussed above. It is a natural follow up question to address.
To address this second question, I investigate whether the recent nominal appreciation of the RMB against the U.S. dollar responds to the intensity of currency manipulation bashing. In order to execute this test, it is necessary to have an index that tracks "currency manipulation" bashing over time. I developed such an index following a procedure similar to the one described above for the construction of the China "currency manipulation" count for individual legislators. The following section describes in more detail the construction of this index.
A. Deriving the China "currency manipulation" bashing index (CCMBI)
The CCMBI index is defined as follows:
Where is the number of newspaper articles printed at time t that contain the keywords "China" and one or more of the following keywords: "currency manipulation" (CM) or "currency manipulator" (CMr) or "exchange rate manipulation" (EM) or "exchange rate manipulator" (EMr) at time t.
The denominator of the CCMBI index is the total number of newspaper articles about China printed at time t. This index is computed on a monthly frequency from January 2000 through December 2010.
The newspaper articles used to construct the CCMBI were retrieved using the This proposition can be explicitly tested by estimating a Vector
Autoregression (VAR) model that includes the rate at which the RMB appreciated against the dollar, and the frequency of currency--manipulation bashing (i.e. the CCMBI series). When estimating the effect of bashing on the RMB appreciation rate, it is important to also control for the effect of changes in the equilibrium exchange rate as well as the effect of economic fundamentals. Thus, the VAR model includes the rate of change of China's real effective exchange rate (to control for changes in the equilibrium exchange rate), as well as the rate of change of industrial production (to control for changes in economic fundamentals). 13 Formally, the adopted VAR model is: (1) where is the first difference of the log of the monthly RMB per U.S.$ at time t, is the percentage change in the real effective exchange rate, and is the rate of change in industrial production in China. In equation (1), n stands for the number of lags. 14 One advantage of using the VAR model is that it assumes that all variables are endogenous, and that they can potentially cause each other. In the context of this paper, the endogenous variables of interest are the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, , and the currency manipulation bashing index, ccmbi. Causality between these two variables is tested by performing a Granger causality test. This test can help to clarify the direction of causality-whether the currency bashing series explains subsequent changes in the nominal exchange rate, or, instead, whether changes in the nominal exchange rate affects subsequent bashing, controlling for other factors. The first direction-bashing affecting the exchange rate-is, in essence, the test of whether bashing works. The reverse directionexchange rate changes affecting bashing-evaluates the proposition that the intensity of the bashing may be a function of past changes in the exchange rate.
The results from the Granger causality test are presented at the bottom of The Granger causality tests, however, do not say much about the magnitude of the effect of bashing on the exchange rate. Worse, they do not say anything about the sign of the effect-whether positive or negative. To find out more about these effects, it is more helpful to look at the actual regressions.
The top of Table 2 presents the key VAR regressions of interest: in regressions (1) and (3) the dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal exchange rate, while in regressions (2) and (4) the constructed bashing index is the dependent variable. Regressions (1) and (2) report the results when the lag--order is 2, while Regressions (3) and (4) report the results when the lag--order is 3. Since the Granger causality tests indicate that the only statistically significant direction of causality is from bashing to the exchange rates, I focus the discussion on
Regressions (1) and (3) (where dependent variable is ) for the remainder of this section.
Regressions (1) and (3) indicate that estimated coefficient of the first lag of the bashing index variable is negative and statistically significant at standard levels, even after controlling for changes in the real effective exchange rate and changes in industrial production. However, the coefficient in the second lag is positive (and significant), and its magnitude is at least as large as that of the first lag (in Regression (1)) and even slightly larger in Regression (3). Thus, when the lag order is 2, there does not appear to be any sustained effect of ccmbi on . However, when the lag--order is 3, the regression indicates that the third lag of the bashing variable is negative and significant at standard levels. For the lag order 3, then, the results appear to indicate that over the entire 3--month period, a surge in bashing decreases the rate at which the exchange rate changes. Additional lags were not statistically significant.
There are no hard and fast rules about which model is the "preferred" one. As stated above, different information criterion advocated different lag orders (either 2 or 3), which is why both are presented here. However, given that the 3 rd lag of the ccmbi is still highly significant, it evidently carries helpful information for modeling changes in the nominal exchange rate. From this perspective, it can be argued that this ought to be the "preferred" regression specification.
To confirm what Regression (3) is suggesting, it is useful to examine the impulse response function implied by the VAR equation. The impulse response function describes the reaction of the dependent variable (in this case, the change in the exchange rate), to a one--standard deviation shock to the bashing index series, after orthogonalizing the residuals in the system in order to ensure that they are not contemporaneously correlated. 15 A graph of the impulse response function, along with the 90 percent confidence intervals, is presented in Figure 4 . As can be readily discerned, a surge in the bashing index results in an almost 4 percent decline on the rate at which the RMB appreciates against the dollar after only one month. After a reversal in month 2, the third lag effect of the shock further reduces the appreciation rate of the RMB by nearly 5 percent. By the fourth month, the effect of the shock has largely dissipated. Thus, the effect of bashing, although negative, is clearly temporary.
But the fact that the effect is negative, even if temporary, suggests that bashing is associated with a subsequent slowdown in the rate at which the RMB appreciates against the U.S. dollar. From the perspective of the United States, this result indicates that bashing is actually counterproductive-it actually works to delay the rate of currency appreciation.
A skeptical reader may claim that this result is purely coincidental. That in reality, bashing should not have any effect on the rate at which the RMB appreciates.
15 Identification is achieved using the Cholesky decomposition. Since the percent change in REER can arguably be identified as the most "exogenous" in the model, it is included first. The percent change in industrial production is included second, and the ccmbi variable is included last. It should be noted, however, that deleting the percent change in REER and IP from the model does not affect the effect of ccmbi on the nominal exchange rate. A comprehensive discussion of impulse response functions can be found in Lutkepohl (2005) , Chapter 2.
But the chances of committing a Type I error-falsely rejecting the null hypothesis of no effect-are relatively small (about 1 in 200 when the VAR includes 3 lags). In addition, it should be noted that there is a plausible explanation for this effect.
Bashing can be annoying at best, and downright insulting at worst. As mentioned in the introduction, China is not the only country that may have an undervalued
currency. Yet, time and again, it is singled out in Congress for its currency management policy. Plain common sense would indicate that such bashing may work to adversely affect Sino--American relations. Temporarily slowing down the rate at which the RMB appreciates may just be one of those consequences.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Why are congressmen so concerned with China's exchange rate regime? The most benevolent, if not naïve, explanation is the contention that congressmen are genuinely concerned about the well--being of American citizens, and thus, anything that threatens their welfare, including the potential loss of jobs from competition from abroad, will motivate Congressional action in their defense. However, a more realistic view, advanced by the public choice and political economy literature, contends that politicians are no different than other individuals in society who seek to maximize their own well--being (Buchanan and Tollison, 1984) . Although they may have inherent preferences and ideological proclivities, the calculus involved in their decision--making process is also influenced by how it would affect their chances of re--election. Notes: The colored line tracks the fraction (in percent) of all news about China that touches on one or more of the following keywords: "currency manipulation," "currency manipulator," "exchange rate manipulation," and "exchange rate manipulator." The black solid line is the 12--month moving average. Notes: This table presents regressions of the change in the log of the nominal exchange rate (RMB/$), , and of the China currency manipulation bashing index, ccmbi, on their own lags, controlling for lags of the growth rate of industrial production in China, "Industrial Production, % change," and the percent change in the real effective exchange rate, "Real Effective Exchange Rate, % change". Subscripts indicate the lag. Regressions 1 and 2 present the results when only 2 lags are included, while Regression 3 and 4 present the results when 3 lags are included. Standard errors are included in parenthesis under each coefficient. ** Significant at the 5% level or better, * significant at the 10% level. The first Granger causality test ( ) examines whether the ccmbi variables affect . The second Granger causality test evaluates the reverse causality: whether the variables affect ccmbi. P--values for each Granger causality test are included under the estimated Chi--squared statistics.
Figure 4
The Effect of "currency manipulation" bashing on the exchange rate: Impulse Response Function
Notes: This figure presents the results of a one--standard deviation shock to the China "currency manipulation" bashing index (CCMBI) to the rate at which the RMB appreciates against the U.S. dollar. The dash lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals.
